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1. Introduction 
1.1. Political and Economic Background 
A Painful Transition: Civil Conflicts and Economic Collapse. Georgia is a 
country of 5.4 million people bounded by the Black Sea, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia 
and Turkey. At independence in April 1991, it appeared to be among the best placed 
of the former Soviet states to make a successful transition. It had a highly educated 
labor force, a long tradition of entrepreneurship, a significant underground economy, a 
prosperous agricultural sector and substantial natural resources. And its location made 
it a primary transit corridor in the Caucasus. 
Despite these favorable conditions, Georgia's political and economic situation 
went into a tailspin. In the early years following the breakup of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) Georgia suffered from intense civil conflicts, first in South Ossetia, then 
in Abkhazia and with the followers of former President Gamsakhurdia. President 
Shevardnadze, invited to return to Georgia in early 1992, and elected Chairman of the 
State Council in October 1992, played a major role of mediation and reconciliation. 
Toward the end of 1993 the intensity of armed conflicts abated. A cease-fire became in 
effect in Abkhazia and an agreement involving Russia and the United Nations was 
signed to work out a peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
Georgia emerged from these two years of civil conflicts and erosion of the 
Government's authority with a collapsed economy. Output had experienced one of the 
sharpest declines observed among FSU countries (70 per cent between 1990 and 
1994); tax revenues had collapsed to 2-3 per cent of GDP and the resulting huge 
deficits had led to hyperinflation and to a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency. 
In addition, the external debt contracted since independence, mostly on commercial 
terms and with short maturities, had grown to unsustainable levels (over 200 per cent 
of exports). 
A Remarkable Turnaround. In early 1994, having made progress toward 
greater political stability, the Government turned its attention toward rebuilding the 
Georgian economy and by the end of the summer, embarked on a stabilization and 
structural reform program with support of both the IMF and the World Bank. Since 
then, implementation has been sustained and achievements have been impressive. The 
monthly inflation rate has been brought down from hyperinflation levels to about 1 per 
cent. The exchange rate has remained stable since the end of 1994 and a new currency 
was successfully introduced in September 1995. Gross official reserves have been 
rebuilt after having been virtually exhausted in 1994. The current account deficit has 
narrowed to 4.6 per cent of GDP. Most of the bilateral debt has been rescheduled. And 
after four years of continuous decline, growth resumed with real GDP growing by 2.4 
per cent in an percent in 1996 — a turnaround unique among transition economies. 
An Ambitious Reform Program. The stabilization and structural reform 
program which brought about this turnaround in economic developments was 
ambitious. The stabilization program relied on a drastic fiscal adjustment and tight Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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monetary policies. The fiscal deficit was reduced from 26.2 per cent of GDP in 1993 
to 7.4 per cent in 1994 with most of the adjustment resting on a compression of 
expenditures. This was effected through the elimination of costly subsidies for bread, 
gas and electricity and a substantial downsizing of the budgetary sector which brought 
down budgetary expenditures from 24.3 per cent to 12.3 per cent of GDP . In 1995 
and 1996 the deficit was further reduced to 4.5 per cent of GDP with this time, efforts 
directed at improving revenue performance while expenditures increased slightly 
relative to GDP. 
In terms of structural reforms, the core of the program has been the setting of an 
appropriate incentive framework for the development of private sector activities. 
Subsidies were virtually eliminated, prices and trade liberalized and an adequate legal 
framework started to be introduced. Privatization proceeded quickly. Small-scale 
privatization is virtually complete and about half of medium and large-scale 
enterprises have been privatized to date. In the agriculture sector, over 50 per cent of 
cultivated land has been distributed to private farmers and the legal basis for the 
functioning of a land market is in place. In the banking sector, prudential regulations 
and the regulatory framework were upgraded and a restructuring strategy is under 
implementation. And the collapse of public finance compelled the Government to 
impose hard-budget constraints to state-owned enterprises, and to increase the 
participation of the private sector in activities which used to be largely publicly 
financed, such as health, education, or transport. In a number of cases — perhaps 
simply as a result of the very difficult circumstances — the Government took fairly 
radical measures, such as increasing the retirement age by five years, granting 
financial and management autonomy to all hospitals and removing 120,000 employees 
of the health sector off the Government payroll. 
Political consensus toward reforms. This extensive set of policy measures 
reflected the Government's strong commitment to reforms and its capacity to 
implement them. This capacity has been strengthened by recent political events. In 
July 1995, Parliament approved a new Constitution which establishes a strong 
executive presidency. In August an assassination attempt on President Shevardnadze 
gave the latter the opportunity to eradicate a paramilitary group which occupied 
dominant positions in Government, and economic structures, and to launch a vigorous 
campaign against corruption. Finally, presidential and parliamentary elections held on 
November 5, 1995 affirmed the Government's proreform platform. Eduard 
Shevardnadze was elected president with 75 per cent of the vote and his party became 
the majority party in Parliament. Since the new Government is in place, policy issues 
are debated widely, and discussions increasingly involve members of Parliament 
(including those from the opposition), at an early stage of the decision-making 
process. 
1.2. Social Developments 
The sharp economic contraction until the end of 1994 and the collapse of public 
expenditures have caused a substantial increase in poverty: real wages fell by percent 
between 1990 and 1994; public expenditures in health and education declined from 12 E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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per cent of GDP in 1991 to less than 2 per cent in 1994 leading to a worsening in 
health indicators I and a drop in enrollment ratios; spending on pensions and other 
benefits fell to 1 per cent of GDP in 1993 although pensioners represent one-fifth of 
the population; an unemployment is estimated to have risen to about 20 per cent in 
urban areas. In addition the civil conflicts have resulted in an influx of about 270,000 
refugees — mostly from Abkhazia — who receive assistance financed to a large extent 
with humanitarian aid provided by foreign donors. Most Georgian families have to 
rely extensively on occasional income from informal sector activities, sales of personal 
effects and assets, and aid from relatives or remittances from abroad to cover their 
basic expenditures. Furthermore, rationing of electricity and lack of heating during 
winters are imposing considerable hardship to the population. 
Since the very start of the reform program in September 1994, the Government 
gave substantial attention to social issues and undertook corrective measures: 
improving the targeting of social benefits while allowing a real increase in their levels; 
increasing wages in the budgetary sector to improve efficiency and restore motivation; 
and introducing reforms in the health and education sectors to target the scarce public 
resources to the most effective uses. 
1.3. External Environment 
Georgia's opportunities for growth largely depend on the country's capacity to 
integrate into international markets and attract foreign investment. In this regard the 
recovery of trade in 1996 following a sharp decline of imports and exports in 1995, is 
encouraging. Exports grew by 20 per cent contributing to a significant reduction of the 
current account deficit to below 8 per cent of GDP, (down from 37 per cent in 1994). 
The recovery can be attributed to the pick up of economic activity in Georgia and in 
the region. In addition, progress toward political stability and an environment 
favorable to private sector activities helped Georgia regain its traditional role of a 
transit country between Asia and Europe. Trade data, although deficient, show 
significant penetration into new markets: about 50 per cent of exports are toward non-
FSU countries and among those, Turkey has become the most important trade partner. 
Caspian Oil. The recent political and economic events have given Georgia an 
opportunity to be considered as a possible outlet for the huge oil reserves of the 
Caspian region. In October 1995 Georgia was chosen as one of the two transit 
countries (along with Russia) for “Early Oil” — the first phase of (AIOC). AIOC is 
financing a project, which involves creating a continuous pipeline from Baku, 
Azerbaijan to Supsa on the Georgian Black Sea coast. The capacity of this pipeline is 
estimated to about 5 million metric tonnes a year and Early Oil is expected to begin 
flowing by end-1998. The rehabilitation of the pipeline will bring a significant amount 
of foreign direct investment during the coming two years in addition to the tariff 
income expected to be received when the oil starts flowing. In addition, there are 
prospects for substantial additional foreign direct investment beyond 1998, as Georgia 
is also one of the transit options being considered for major export pipelines beyond 
the “Early Oil” phase. Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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External Debt. Over the last two years Georgia's capacity to repay debt has 
improved considerably following the rescheduling on concessional terms of 94 per 
cent of its bilateral debt. After independence, Georgia had accumulated substantial 
external obligations amounting to USD l billion by the end of 1994, most of it on 
commercial terms and due by 1997. The bulk of the obligations to FSU countries had 
arisen from non-payment for natural gas imports from Turkmenistan. In 1995 and 
1996, unable to meet its debt service obligations, Georgia obtained a standstill on 
obligations falling due, and. while building up a reserve for debt service payments in a 
special account in the Netherlands Bank, requested to its creditors a rescheduling on 
concessional terms. To date agreements have been signed with 7 creditors, including 
the largest (Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation) and negotiations are ongoing 
with the remaining creditors. 
2. Recent Economic Developments 
The first quarter of 1997 saw a seasonal decline in economic activity but the 
annualized growth rate remains impressive. Inflation is firmly under control and the 
lari remains stable. The small scale private sector seems to be responding to stability 
with greatly increased activity. However, the largest enterprises are still 
overwhelmingly state owned and are making little progress in restructuring. The 
capacity of the government and the legal system to enforce reforms that have been 
passed is low. Physical infrastructure is still poor, and its renovation is still largely 
dependent on foreign assistance, as the state remains unable to significantly improve 
revenue collection. Yet there are recent signs that, after pressure from donors, the 
government has recognized the need to press ahead with deeper structural reforms, 
particularly in privatization. If continued progress can be made on resolving the 
separatist conflicts then the chances for increased investment and sustaining fast 
growth look promising. 
GDP growth in the year to the end of March 1997 was estimated at 8.9 per cent 
by the State Department for Statistics, but figures remain very approximate as at least 
40 per cent of activity is unrecorded. The-government has revised its target range for 
1997 upwards to between 10.2 and 14.1 per cent. The IMF predicts 10 per cent 
growth, which would maintain Georgia's position as the fastest growing economy in 
the CIS. Trade remains the fastest growing sector though the rate of increase is 
declining, and now accounts for 25 per cent of value added. Industry is continuing the 
recovery begun in 1996 but now accounts for only 15 per cent of GDP. Foreign 
investment data is also highly unreliable, but does seem to be rising, although total 
amounts remain low. 
The 1997 budget was passed on February 21 and sets revenue and deficit targets 
of 12.2 and 2.8 per cent of GDP respectively. Tax collection will have to more than 
double from that achieved in 1996. In the first quarter revenue was 14.6 per cent 
below target. The passing of the new tax code should, help to improve performance in 
the second half of the year. For now government revenue collection is easily the 
weakest in the CIS and among the worst in the world. Some progress is being made in E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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expenditure management, but rather than being, reduced, expenditure arrears continue 
to accumulate. Health and education spending amounted to just USD 5 and USD 1 0 
per capita respectively in 1996. The government's inability to mobilize significant 
revenue is a threat to the sustainability and enforceability of reforms. Significant 
concessions have been given to Achara in terms of reduced transfers to the central 
budget. 
Money supply and therefore inflation remains under control, albeit with donor 
assistance. However the high degree of dollarisation in the economy coupled with the 
continued lack of confidence in the banking sector remains a worry to monetary 
policy. However, confidence in the Lari and the continuing reform of the banking 
sector provides a basis for future stability, and an opportunity for more sophisticated 
financial instruments to be introduced, such as short term government bonds. One 
instrument which appears to require reform is the credit auction, as it appears to be in 
effect an implicit subsidy and its effectiveness in terms of lowering commercial banks' 
lending rates and broadening the interbank market is unclear. 
The Dollar-Lari Exchange rate continues to show — remarkable stability, 
particularly in view of the fact that Georgia is still emerging from economic crisis. 
NBG interventions have been successful in maintaining a rate of below $1.3 to the 
Lari. TICEX has also been successful in maintaining a healthy USD5 million volume 
of interbank trade per month. 
Prices rose seasonally in the first quarter, mostly accounted for by fruit and 
vegetables. The Government's 10-12 per cent inflation target for 1997 remains realistic 
and could even be lower given the tight control exercised over the money supply. 
There is, however, still concern regarding the out of date measures used for the 
Consumer Price Index and the lack of a Producer Price Index. 
According to SDS estimates the current account deficit narrowed from 12.7 per 
cent of GDP in 1995 to 6.9 per cent of GDP in 1996 as a result of revisions to figures, 
which are still particularly unreliable. The State Customs Department collected only 
2.2 per cent of the value of recorded imports in customs duties in 1996. Progress 
continues on application for membership of the WTO, which will involve substantial 
improvements in customs procedures. Imports seem to be falling in terms of GDP, as 
humanitarian aid and cheap financing dries up, but exports have yet to show 
significant increases. Capital account recording in the balance of payments is even 
weaker than the current account, but great progress has been made in recording and 
rescheduling foreign debt obligations, which now stand at 32 per cent of 1996 GDP. 
The EU, Turkey and China are the only debtors with whom agreements still have to be 
reached. 
There was almost no progress in privatization in the first quarter but it seems that 
the government will press ahead with cash auctions at lower prices in the second half 
of the year. Currently 88 per cent of shares issued in medium and large enterprises are 
still held by the state. Only in trade, services and agriculture has more than half of state 
property approved for privatization actually been sold. The ten largest enterprises 
account for 71 per cent of the total valuation of MLEs, and very little has been done 
about selling or restructuring most of these. Electricity distribution companies are to 
be offered for sale at cash auctions, but demand will depend on progress made with 
regulation proposals. Twenty five per cent of agricultural land has now been Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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privatized, but much of this is still apparently not used, and there is no active market in 
land due to the lack of proper land registration systems. Financial markets are similarly 
hampered by a continuing lack of regulations on for example share registry. 
The Government is attempting to improve the social safety net. A recent law has 
established the need to determine a minimum subsistence level and progressively raise 
the minimum wage towards this level. As yet no mechanism is in place for this 
exercise. Data on the household sector remains poor, but incomes do appear to be 
rising fast. Households still rely overwhelmingly on irregular income rather than 
salaries. The SDS estimates that the average monthly wage at the end of the first 
quarter was GEL 52. Incomes from self-employment are significantly higher. National 
unemployment is estimated by the SDS at 13.7 per cent, but the Conjuncture Research 
Center found a figure of 28 per cent of the workforce in Tbilisi in 1996, if discouraged 
workers are included. Underemployment remains significant but uninvestigated. The 
social safety net continues to provide particularly low benefits to too many people. 
3. Production and Investments 
Growth seems to be continuing at an impressive rate, albeit from a low base. 
Preliminary estimates by the State Department for Statistics (SDS) for the first quarter 
of 1997 show that GDP for the three months was GEL 856 million (USD 664 million), 
or approximately GEL. 171 (USD 133) per capita. This is approximately 40 per cent 
lower than in the fourth quarter of 1996, but economic activity remains so seasonal 
that it is more appropriate to compare to the first quarter of 1996. The SDS estimates 
that over this period GDP has increased by 8.9 per cent in real terms. The 
Government's target for growth in 1997 has been revised up to between 10.2 and 14.1 
per cent. IMF forecasts, using slightly different estimates, agree that in 1997 Georgia 
will retain its 1996 position as the fastest growing economy in the CIS. Figures remain 
highly subjective, however, with the SDS now estimating that 40 per cent of GDP may 
be produced in the unrecorded economy'. While investment appears to be starting to 
recover, it is still far below the levels that will be necessary if such growth rates are to 
be sustained. 
3.1. GDP and Growth 
The figures in Table 1, calculated by the SDS on the basis of reports from 
enterprises, show clearly how much activity still fluctuates. Reported value added in 
the first quarter of 1996 was in nominal terms less than half that in the last quarter of 
the year. Partly this may be a statistical phenomenon: GDP figures are reported 
cumulatively and the last quarter's figures may include some production for the whole 
year. Falls in agricultural production and the construction sector at the beginning of 
the year are also to be expected. (However, the substantial falls in most other sectors 
may be due to energy supply constraints, though the substantial fall in transport and 
communications, a key issue, could be a combination of poor access, disrupted E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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electricity supply and a fall in demand for its services from other sectors. During the 
first quarter of, the year, when the network relies on expensive thermal electricity 
generation, supply is at its most unreliable. A large part of productive capacity is thus 
left standing idle. If energy and infrastructure problems can be solved, the potential for 
further high growth is great.) 
Table 1 
GDP at current prices 1995 - 1997 (GEL million) 
  GDP in current prices 
  1995  1996  1996Q1 1996Q2 1996Q3 1996Q4 1997Q1 
Industry  454.2  616.6 130.0 143.0 167.6 176.0 150.0
Agriculture  1,192.7  1,432.7 217.3 324.5 474.9 416.0 239.0
Construction  135.4  225.8 12.7 43.1 81.0 89.0 14.0
Transport and communications  126.3  260.2  17.0 76.2  80.0  87.0  37.0
Trade  671.9  1,077.9 170.8 238.5 309.6 359.0 209.0
Other  branches  52.4  78.1 10.6 12.5 25.0 30.0 13.0
Total material production  2,632.9  3,691.3  558.4 837.8  1,138.1  1,157.0  662.0
Total non-marketing production  384.1  699.1  118.2 160.1  190.8  230.0  148.0
GDP at factor cost  3,017.0  4,390.4  676.6 997.9  1,328.9  1,387.0  810.0
Net  taxes  120.0  154.0 22.0 38.0 47.0 47.0 46.0
GDP at market prices  3,137.0  4,544.4  698.6 1,035.9  1,375.9  1,434.0  856.0
GDP per capita (USD)  490  716  111 162  217  226  133
Source: State Department for Statistics 
Changes of growth in real terms are at present calculated using the CPI as a 
deflator. This is not standard international practice. When a PPI (see chapter 'Prices') is 
calculated for Georgia than this will more accurately reflect real growth rates, when 
substituted for the CPI as a deflator. SDS thus considers the estimates of changes 
below only preliminary. 
Table 2 
Real Annual GDP Growth 1995 - 1997 (per cent) 
  GDP in current prices 
  1995  1996 1996Q1 1996Q2 1996Q3 1996Q4  1997Q1 
Industry  -9.6  7.0 4.9 3.2 7.0 11.4  6.8
Agriculture 17.9  5.1  8.2  15.7  12.9 -13.7  4.7
Construction 14.6  25.1  -16.0  6.7  36.0 43.5  0.8
Transport and communications  15.8  0.4  10.3  -0.3  0.0 -0.6  3.0
Trade  155.1  30.0 51.7 -0.8 20.1 73.6  10.2
Other  branches  4.8  6.9 2.7  17.6 4.9 6.5  12.5
Total material production  21.2  13.0  16.0  8.7  14.4 19.8  6.8
Total non-marketing production  5.6  10.9  1.7  17.6  8.5 14.2  4.1
GDP at factor cost  19.0  12.0  13.8  9.7  13.6 16.7  6.3
Net taxes  -83.6  -  183.0  85.7  40.7 -  86.4
GDP at market prices  2.4  11.4  18.2  10.7  15.0 10.6  8.9
Source: State Department for Statistics Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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3.2. Structure of the Economy 
It is clear however that growth is still very strong. This seems to come 
overwhelmingly from the small scale private sector. Most of medium and large 
industry has not yet been privatized but the State Tax Service reports that 80 per cent 
of its revenues come from the private sector, despite the fact that the old state sector is 
much better registered. It seems that much of the state sector is inactive, and as to 
explained in Chapter Eight, there is an urgent need to press ahead with privatization, 
restructuring, and liquidation for the parts that cannot be restructured, to free up assets 
for the more active sectors. The breakdown of activity by economic sectors over the 
year is practically unchanged since the previous quarter. The growth rate of the trade 
sector is slowing down however. Having more than tripled in official statistics in two 
years, the growth rate in trade was only 10 per cent in the first quarter of 1997. With 
continuing stability and low inflation it should now be possible for activities requiring 
a longer time horizon to expand. 
Yet new businesses continue to face considerable problems. It is still almost 
impossible to obtain credit from banks for over six months, unless the loans are 
subsidized by international donors. There are continuing problems with the application 
of tax rules, in some cases amounting to effective extortion. Small enterprises still 
complain about excessive intrusion from police and local authorities, sometimes 
apparently with the aim of reducing competition for more well-connected businesses. 
The removal of kiosks from the streets of Tbilisi and Kutaisi seems to be a case in 
point. Local authorities, who are still not democratically elected, also continue to have 
influence over the availability of premises. There is no free market in urban land. The 
small scale private sector has adapted extremely effectively to operating in what, in 
some sectors more accurately than others, has been described as a 'cian economy'. 
Sustainable growth will be easier to achieve when politicians and officials are forced 
to reduce their involvement. 
 


















Source: Data from State Department for Statistics 
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The GDP figures in Tables 1 and 2 are compiled on the basis of the SDS's 
business register, which, as of the end of April, contained details of 35,100 enterprises. 
The 1994 Law on Entrepreneurship required all businesses to reregister by the end of 
1995. This deadline was extended to September (then December) 1996 but the process 
still continues. The register provides some further information on the structure of the 
economy, and details are given in Tables 3 and 4. Of enterprises that have registered, 
over half are in trade, though these are mostly very small. One third are in Tbilisi. 87 
per cent are recorded as privately owned, though this may not take account of 
extensive state minority holdings. The largest enterprises are still overwhelmingly 
state owned, as explained in Chapter Eight. 
 
Table 3 
Enterprises on the Business Register, by Ownership, as of April 1, 1997 
 Number  % 
State   3,202  9.5 
Municipal, public and unions  980  2.9 
Private property without foreign participation  28,851  86.0 
Private propaerty with foreign participation  420  1.3 
Foreign property  78  0.2 
Georgia, total   33,531  100 
Source: State Department for Statistics  
 
Table 4 
Enterprises on the Business Register, by Sector, as of April 1, 1997 
Sector Number  % 
Agriculture,forestry, fishing  1,576  4.6 
Mining 108  0.3 
Manufacturing 5,150  15.1 
Electricity, gas and water suply  190  0.6 
Construction 1,275  3.7 
Trade and repair services  17,516  51.4 
Hotels and restaurants  954  2.8 
Transport, storage, communications  2,127  6.2 
Financial services  444  1.3 
Real estate  1,348  4.0 
Government and defence  736  2.2 
Education 520  1.5 
Health and social services  850  2.5 
Other municipal and social services  1,271  3.7 
Georgia, total   33,531  100 
Source: State Department for Statistics  Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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3.3. Shadow Economy 
Much work still clearly needs to be done to improve the coverage of the business 
register, and thus of GDP figures. The SDS reports that more cooperation is needed 
from local authorities and banks, who often continue to deal with unregistered 
companies. A revised law on statistics has been presented to Parliament and was to be 
considered in the middle of May, though it may be further delayed. Some aspects of 
the current draft may need to be altered to clarify assurances of confidentiality and 
guarantee to providers of information that no individual data will be publicized or 
passed on to organizations like the tax service. Equally the penalties for not providing 
information or for providing wrong or partial data need to be established and enforced. 
Unfortunately, corruption and incompetence in official organizations still mean that 
registration can be time-consuming and expensive even for those that see ft as 
worthwhile. There must be incentives to operate in the formal sector, and while banks 
provide little credit and the police seem to offer protection only for supplementary 
payments, these incentives are not obvious. The economy remains largely cash based 
due to the population's experience of losing savings in pyramid schemes and domestic 
currency bank accounts in 1993 and 1994, and suspicion of tax inspectors and other 
controlling bodies is still very strong. Reducing regulation and corruption are likely to 
be the most effective ways to bring informal activity into the legal sphere, but winning 
confidence will be a slow process. 
 
Table 5 
GDP by Expenditure, 1996 
 GEL  millions  % 
Final consumption  4,841  94 
  Individual consumption  4,655  91 
   Household and business consumption  4,105  80 
   Non-profit instiutions serving households  505  10 
   Government  45  1 
  Collective consumption  186  4 
Gross fixed capital formation  445  9 
Changes in stocks  227  4 
Net exports  -390  -8 
  Exports  593  12 
  Imports  -983  -19 
GDP by expenditure  5,123  100 
GDP by production  4,547  89 
Statistical discrepancy  -576  -11 
Source: State Department for Statistics  
 
As mentioned above, the SDS estimates that about 40 per cent of GDP may now 
be produced in the shadow economy. The production figures for 1996 include an 
adjustment to allow for unrecorded activity which amounts to 33 per cent of the E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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reported figures.  The 40 per cent figure arises from calculating GDP by expenditure 
for 1996. The introduction of a new household survey has allowed more reliable 
expenditure calculations to be made. Although many respondents still underestimate 
what they spend, coverage is likely to be better than that compiled from production 
reports. The result, as shown below, is a GDP of GEL 5,123 million (USD 4,100 
million). This is 13 per cent larger than the production estimates, of which a third is 
already ascribed to the shadow economy, and thus is 69 per cent greater than GDP as 
recorded by production reports. This represents an unrecorded economy of 40 per cent 
of the total. The true size of both legal and illegal economy could be even higher. The 
expenditure calculation is unlikely to be complete, and a per capita GDP of GEL 1,000 
still seems on the low side. 
3.4. GNP and Other GDP Estimates 
The final stage in national account calculation is to consider net factor income 
from abroad. For the first time in recent years the SDS has published estimates of these 
figures. Foreigners are estimated to transfer abroad GEL 89 million more than 
Georgians abroad repatriate, so GNP comes to GEL 5,034 million. Depreciation 
estimates the cost of replacing worn out fixed capital, so net national product measures 
the amount of money available for spending on goods and services after selling aside 
enough to maintain the capital stock. National income is increased by a net inflow of 
GEL 106 million from abroad in the form of grants, wage remittances and other 
current transfers. All these measures should be considered extremely approximate. 
Depreciation is always hard to estimate, and with non existent accounting standards, 
almost impossible. Given the current state of the banking system, large financial flows 
still happen in cash and can only be guessed at. 
All the GDP estimates above will be superseded when the SDS completes its 
work on compiling full national accounts for the period since independence. However 
final results are not expected until towards the end of 1997. Until then all figures 
available are only preliminary estimates. The IMF and the Ministry of Finance still use 
alternative IMF figures which put GDP approximately 20 per cent higher than the 
SDS's production estimates. The Ministry of Economy in its Indicative Plan uses the 
SDS production figure for 1995 and the SDS expenditure figure for 1996. The SDS 
estimates are the only ones based on collection of actual data rather than extrapolation 
from a base year, though, as explained above, the subjective element of the total is still 
very large. Given the importance of GDP figures in assessing the progress of reform, 
not only for measuring growth but also for indicators like the government tax take and 
velocity of money circulation, work on making the government's various estimates 
consistent should be a priority. 
The IMF's estimate for GDP growth in 1996 was 10.5 per cent, slightly lower 
than the 11.4 per cent of the SDS. Still Georgia remains comfortably the fastest 
growing country in the CIS and among the fastest growing in the world. The IMF has 
published its own growth estimates and projections for all the CIS, shown below. As 
emphasized previously in GET, the collapse of the Georgian economy was greater 
than any of the other post communist depressions (so far) and fast growth from such a Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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low base is only to be expected. Yet, as the government of Belarus is demonstrating, 
the wrong policies and discouragement of investment can still stamp out recovery. 
Compared to many others in the region Georgian policy looks enlightened. 
 
Table 6 
GDP, GNP and National Income, 1996 
 GEL  million 
Gross Domestic Product  5,123 
  Plus revenues from property abroad  7 
  Minus revenues transferred abroad  -96 
Gross National Product  5,034 
  Minus depratiation  -616 
Net National Product  4,418 
  Plus current transferes received from abroad  106 
  Minus current transferes sent abroad  0 
Net Natioanal Income  4,524 
Source: State Department for Statistics  
 
Table 7 
CIS Growth Rates 1995-1997, Projected by IMF (Per cent) 
 1995  1996  1997 
(forecast) 
Armenia 6.9 6.6  5.5 
Azerbaijan -11.0 1.3  5.2 
Belarus -10.2 2.0  0.0 
Georgia 2.4 10.5  10.0 
Kazakhstan -8.9 1.0  2.0 
Kyrgystan 1.3 5.6  6.9 
Moldova -3.0 -8.0  3.0 
Russia -4.0 -2.8  3.0 
Tajikistan -12.5 -7.0  -5.3 
Turkmenistan -8.2 -3.0  1.7 
Ukraine -12.0 -10.0  2.7 
Uzbekistan -0.9 1.6  2.0 
Source: IMF Economic Outlook 
3.5. Investment 
The state of balance of payments and national accounts statistics make it 
impossible to be precise about the level of investment in the Georgian economy. GDP 
figures given above suggest that domestic investment is still negative: depreciation 
exceeds gross fixed capital formation by 40 per cent. The two are extremely hard to 
measure however, and these figures should be treated with skepticism. Domestic 
savings may be rising, but are certainly low, as incomes are low and likely to rise. 
Unfortunately only a small part of them is channelled by the banking sector, so it is E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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hard to know where they are going. Capital expenditure by the government is planned 
to be only 1.1 per cent of GDP in 1997, and as explained in Chapter Three, this is 




Registered Foreign Investments of over USD 100,000 by Country of Origin, 
As of May 7,1997 (cumulative) 
Country  Licenses issued  Value (USD)  % of Total 
Israel 7  16,269,165  16.2
Ireland 5  14,984,530  14.9
USA 19  10,220,426  10.2
Korea 2  9,120,500  9.1
Germany 24  7,983,221  7.9
Britain 16  6,693,570  6.7
Netherlands 9  6,516,770  6.5
Russia 22  6,820,938  6.8
Bermuda 2  4,120,190  4.1
Turkey 12  3,916,734  3.9
Australia 1  2,700,000  2.7
Italy 6  2,243,136  2.2
Switzerland 10  2,191,891  2.2
Cyprus 3  1,643,429  1.6
Greece 3  848,257  0.8
Austria 3  535,164  0.5
Bulgaria 2  487,650  0.5
Liechtenstein 1  462,159  0.5
Bahamas 1  400,000  0.4
Hong Kong  1  350,000  0.3
Venezuela 1  302,378  0.3
Monaco 1  270,000  0.3
Panama 2  160,000  0.2
Canada 1  150,000  0.1
Hungary 1  131,012  0.1
Malta 1  120,000  0.1
Lebanon 1  117,300  0.1
Seychelles 1  114,724  0.1
Lithunia 1  113,084  0.1
Latvia 1  108,500  0.1
France 1  104,612  0.1
Luxembourg 1  103,359  0.1
Belgium 1  102,000  0.1
Poland 1  100,000  0.1
Singapore 1  100,000  0.1
Total 165  100,604,699  100.0
Source: Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic relations 
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Foreign investment is going to play a crucial role in financing the reconstruction 
needed, and in helping to provide the foreign currency to pay off the large foreign 
debt. Currently Georgia still relies on large grants and concessional loans from 
international financial organizations, Europe and the USA. Again the balance of 
payments figures do not identify these flows reliably, and the government's plan to 
compile details of aid flows since independence has made little progress. Private 
foreign investment will certainly have to increase dramatically as the governmental 
flows dry up. Growth as-seen now can be achieved with quite low levels of 
investment, as marginal returns are now extremely high and much can be achieved by 
simple reorganization and better use of existing human and physical capital. If fast 
growth is to be sustained Georgia will have to be achieving investment of well above 
the world average of about 25 per cent of GDP. This seems unlikely in the short to 
medium term. 
Data on private foreign investment gives a rather worrying picture. There have 
been only 5 investment projects, worth USD 2.5 million, registered at the Foreign 
Investment Agency of the Ministry of Trade since the end of 1996. There is serious 
concern about this within the government. A Presidential decree of March 30th 
established a foreign investment council within the Chancellery, chaired by the 
President, to develop policy for the attraction of investment. Three separate divisions 
will work on improving Georgia's international reputation as a safe place to invest, 
continuing the stabilization of the banking sector and promoting tax and customs 
legislation reforms. Many in government have also been calling for the re-
establishment of tax holidays for foreign investors that were abolished with the 
introduction of the Law on Investment in November 1996. 
 
Table 9 
Registered Foreign Investments of Over USD 100,000 by Sector, as of May 
7, 1997 (cumulative) 
Sector Licenses  issued  Value (USD)  % of Total 
Manufacturing 32  39,145,619  38.9 
Communications 10  22,446,887  22.3 
Food Industry  43  13,392,853  13.3 
Banking 13  7,704,756  7.7 
Agricultute 4  5,894,730  5.9 
Trade 30  5,233,575  5.2 
Construction 8  2,691,594  2.7 
Transport 4  2,479,080  2.5 
Service 11  1,559,604  1.5 
Health 1  107,000  0.1 
Total 156  100,655,698  100.0 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations 
Note: This table includes all investments since independence on which the Ministry has 
information. However it is seriously incomplete.  
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The latter change may not be necessary. Firstly there are clearly large 
investments coming in that are not being registered. The law requires investments of 
over USD 100,000 to be registered within sixty days of contracts being signed, but 
there are no sanctions established if this is not done. Many large and well publicized 
recent investments have not been reported to the Ministry of Trade, and many 
prominent western companies have been operating in Georgia for years without 
registration. Also many investments that were previously recorded as foreign were 
apparently Georgians repatriating money sent abroad, but setting up tenuous foreign 
involvement to qualify for tax holidays. The new law has removed this distortion. 
Repatriation of Georgian money is likely to be continuing, and at increasing rates, but 
is no longer recorded as foreign investment. For larger investors and genuine 
foreigners most research indicates that tax holidays are not a significant attraction 
compared to stability and predictability of treatment. There is now considerable global 
competition for foreign investment, but there is some scope for Georgia to distinguish 
itself in the region if it can effectively address some problems of corruption and legal 
enforcement, and establish itself as an open economy that genuinely welcomes foreign 
involvement and supports private business. 
Transport, communications and energy remain perhaps the greatest priorities for 
investment, as they are bottlenecks for other sorts of investment. Given Georgia's. 
small size, economic growth will depend on export performance, and most foreign 
investment is likely to be oriented to the world market. On transport considerable 
concrete progress has been made. The Caspian will be a vital source of oil and gas for 
Europe, and an important trade route to Asia, and Georgia has opportunities to benefit 
from this without suffering some of the economic problems associated with over-
reliance on natural resource exports. The project to reconstruct the Baku-Supsa oil 
pipeline remains the largest source of foreign investment, and is encouraging other 
investors to follow, despite the fact that no decision has been made on the route for 
transporting the main flow of Azeri oil. Subcontracts have been awarded to Australian, 
French, German and British companies, usually in partnership with Georgian firms. 
The World Bank has also provided a USD 1.4 million credit towards preliminary work 
to determine suitable routes for the main flow. There are also prospects for other 
pipeline deals. At the first session of the Georgian-Russian joint commission on 
economic co-operation an agreement was signed envisaging transport of natural gas 
from Russia to Turkey through Georgia. 
Other aspects of transport are also showing promise. The 1996 agreement on 
cotton transport signed by the Presidents of Georgia and Uzbekistan represented one 
of the first significant commodity exports from the region to bypass Russia. 
Agreements were also signed then on setting independent rail tariffs, bypassing the 
CIS framework that had favored Russia. While the difficulties of building an export 
pipeline out of Kazakhstan continue, 1.2 million tones of oil is expected to be sent by 
train from the Tengiz field to Batumi. Much of the equipment required for oil 
exploitation in the Caspian is also to be sent by rail from Poti. The European Union's 
Traceca program is designed to provide technical assistance for the development of the 
corridor from Europe to Asia via the Caspian and Black Seas. The World Bank has 
provided a USD 15 million loan for road rehabilitation, and the EBRD plans a USD 15 
million investment in Poti port. Despite this progress there is a very long way to go. Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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Ferry services have resumed between Poti and two ports in Bulgaria and one in 
Ukraine, and services are expected this year with Russia, Romania and Ukraine, but 
recorded volumes are extraordinarily low. The rail track and rolling stock that remains 
is still in a very poor state, after war, neglect and corruption. With the Abkazian route 
to Russia still blocked, the only international rail route currently operating is with 
Baku. A project to join Akhalkalaki in Georgia with Kars in Turkey and connect to the 
European network is now out to tender. Until then the idea of a transport hub or 
corridor is far from reality. The Ministry of Transport's forecast of 5 million tones to 
be carried by rail in 1997, should be seen in the context of 120 million tones carried in 
1986. 
In other sectors there is even more still to be done. Energy investment awaits the 
completion of privatization plans, described in Chapter Eight. There has been foreign 
investment in communications, particularly in the mobile sphere, but large parts of the 
sector continue to be run as profitable private businesses by the Ministry of 
Communications, and many potential investors have been put off. There may still be 
some resistance to the idea of foreign investment in Georgia, exemplified by the fact 
that foreigners are not allowed to own land, even commercial land. Yet overall, and 
certainly by regional standards, the climate for investment is welcoming, and inflows 
can be expected to rise fast. 
4. Money and Banking 
Lari money supply remains under control in Georgia, underpinning the 
Government's economic reform program. As a result inflation is being steadily 
harnessed, and the exchange rate with the dollar maintained since the Lari's 
introduction, albeit with donor support. The last six months has seen a dramatic 
decrease in the rate of Lari money supply increase, suggesting a decrease in relative 
demand for the Lari. 
The size of the informal economy remains hard to estimate, though the imputed 
value of the informal economy in GDP statistics — 40 per cent — gives some 
indication of its size. This is still of concern, especially with regard to the control of 
the exchange rate. 
Net foreign assets were depleted by 100 million Lari in the first quarter of 1997 
as the NBG successfully defended the Lad against the dollar. 
Commercial bank deposits continue to show an annualized increase, the majority 
of which is an increase in Lari holdings, indicating a cautious growth of confidence in 
Georgia's currency and banking sector. With regards the latter, foreign banking 
influence seems to have stimulated competition for deposits as higher interest rates 
have been offered. Banks not meeting prudential standards continue to face liquidation 
or merger. 
The regulatory environment continues to approach international standards. 
However, the assessment of credit risk on loans still shows room for improvement, and 
laws, most importantly bankruptcy, have not been fully tested through the courts. E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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Credit auctions continue to provide a source of subsidized credit to the 
commercial banks, who use the facility enthusiastically. Whether the auction has 
reduced interest rates to commercial bank customers is open to question. However, the 
exercise has been valuable in introducing Georgian banks to new financial market 
products. One such market, Short Term Government Bonds (Treasury Bills), is due to 
start in the near future with the 1997 budget allocating GEL 10 Million for the purpose 
of testing the market potential. The participation of foreigners in this market has not 
been decided. If allowed it is expected that the increased competition generated would 
reduce bond yields significantly. 
4.1. Commercial Bank Credit 
Table 10 shows the commercial banks lending to enterprises from December 
1995 to March 1997. Although still at a low level, and concentrated on short term 
lending to traders, there are signs of improvement. Total commercial banks lending to 
enterprises increased in the first quarter 1997 by 13 per cent. Despite new provisions 
of loan loss regulations, overdue short term loans and overdue interest on loans 
increased in February and March 1997, indicating that commercial banks still have 
problems in adequately assessing credit risk and/or do not have adequate mechanisms 
of loan recovery (legal procedures have not, as yet, been tested). It is likely that more 
bad loans will be identified during 1997 as both the commercial banks and the 




Commercial Banks Lending to Enterprises. December 1995 - March 1997 
(GEL thousends) 
 1995  1996  1997 
 Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar 
Commercial Bank 
Lending to Enterprises in 
GEL 
81,362  104,222 81,178 60,425 67,065 68,787 69,668 76,181
Current  loans  21,008  26,392 25,671 40,732 53,493 55,259 54,566 57,038
Overdue Short-term Loans 45,285  57,436  24,500  12,037  8,354  8,100  9,623  12,684
Overdue interest on Loans  15,068  20,395  31,007  7,656  5,218  5,428  5,479  6,459
Overdue loans/loans to 
enterprises (%)  68.3  68.5 48.8 22.8 13.5 12.8 15.0 18.2
Overdue interest and 
loans/ total loans to 
enterprise (%) 
74.2  74.7 68.4 32.6 20.2 19.7 21.7 25.1
Source: GET calculations from data provided by the NBG 
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4.2. Credit Auctions and Interest Rates 
During the first quarter the NBG continued maintaining low interest rates on 
interbank credit auctions. The interbank credit auctions were introduced as a way of 
beginning the process of developing financial markets. Before July 1996 it was strictly 
an interbank market and the NBG did not participate to any great extent. Thereafter the 
NBG began to take a more active role and began to reduce interest rates on the basis of 
an assessment that interest rates were unnecessarily high in real terms. In a more 
sophisticated and deeper banking system this sort of intervention would normally lead 
to a reduction in the general level of deposit and lending rates in the economy but as 
shown in Table 11 this has simply not happened. The NBG is not able to influence 
interest rates because It cannot (and should not) provide sufficient funds to exert such 




Credit Auctions and Interbank Credit Market Annual Interest Rates March 
1996 - March 1997 
  Credit Auctions Rate (annualised)  Commercial Banks Rate (annualised) 
  1 month  3 month  1 month  3 month 
Mar-96  48 70 72 67
Jun-96  41 46 62 59
Sep-96  36 42 59 57
Dec-96  25 28 65 58
Jan-97  22 23 64 58
Feb-97  20 20 64 60
Mar-97  19 19 66 59
Source: GET calculations from data provided by the NBG 
Note: The credit auctions rate is calculated as a weighted average. The commercial banks 
lending rate reported in the table can only be treated as indicative since it is an unweighted 
average of the rates reported on a haphazard basis to the NBG. For this reason the average credit 
auction rate can appear higher than the commercial banks' lending rate. In practice this does not 
occur at exactly the same moment in time. 
 
Commercial banks still charge and are able to get very high interest rates on their 
short term lending. Rates remain high for a number of reasons. Most loans are made to 
finance short term trade activities which are high in risk and typically have a high 
return for traders. Although the interest rates spread have decreased, they remain 
substantially high; lending rates still include very high risk premium, regardless of 
their denomination (Lari or Dollar). Lending rates are decreasing, probably driven by 
increased competition and also by new inflows of foreign capital, mainly through 
development banks and international organisations. 
According to some preliminary estimates, the average weighted lending rate 
(Lari denominated loans) was 43.6 % in March 1997 and 36.2 % in April 1997. This E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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suggests that the unweighted averages reported on Table 4.5 are substantially over-
estimated. 
Such high rates also suggest a shortage of bank credit and therefore a lack of 
effective competition between banks. The shortage of credit is directly linked to the 
banks' inability to raise deposits and particularly term deposits despite the high deposit 
rates of interest. The deposit problem arises from the poor reputation of banks in the 
past. Once lost, banking credibility is hard to re-establish. Despite the dramatic 
improvement in the banking system achieved by the banking reforms introduced over 
the past two years, the public has yet to respond and the banking system as a whole 
has much to do in educating the public to assess bank quality. Until the reputation 
problem is solved, the current NBG policy of reducing interest rates to banks does 
little more than increase the return to banks on their current lending activity. 
4.3. Banking Sector Reform 
On January 31, 1997 the NBG issued a resolution on the Minimum Size of 
Statutory Funds for Commercial Banks, amounting to GEL 5 million and applicable 
by January 1, 2001. There are 9 certified banks and 3 FSCBs with statutory funds of 
more than GEL 1 million. The new standards for commercial banks will encourage 
banks with smaller capital bases to merge. Foreign banks with greater resources are 
also expected to enter the market. 
The banking system reform has been analyzed in the last edition of GET. Much 
of the resulting shakedown occurred in 1995 and 1996. Table 12 displays the results of 
this process and also shows the healthy entrance of newly registered banks to the 
system continuing in the first quarter of 1997. 
The three Former State banks still exist occupy a special place in this reform as a 
result of their size and geographical coverage. Two have displayed great progress in 
transforming themselves to commercial entities. The third, Agrobank, still has 
problems with past bad loans and asset management but requires sensitive 
restructuring if its valuable branch structure is to be maintained. 
 
Table 12 
Banks Liquidation December 1994 - March 1997 
  Dec-94 Jun-95 Dec-95 Jun-96 Dec-96  Jan-97  Mar-97 
Liquidated  banks  2 39 130  149 172 172  177
Self  liquidet  banks  1 2 15  17 22 22  23
Liquidated by the NBG  0  36  106  116  127  127  131
Taken  over  1 1  5  12 18 18  19
Merged  0  0 5  5 7 7  8
Newly  registered  banks  0  0 0  0 2 3  3
Total banks existing  228  191  101  82  61  62  58
Source: National Bank of Georgia 
 
Finally it should be noted that NBG itself has modernized in that it has 
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provisions (including guarantees for wheat importers) and is to undergo a reform of its 
accounting system in the near future. 
4.4. Short Term Government Bonds (STGB) 
The 1997 budget includes GEL 10 million for the development of a STGB 
market. In terms of the projections for domestic financing of the budget deficit this is 
little more than a token amount, but it remains an important step for the development 
of domestic debt markets. The first issue is planned for July 1997. The Ministry of 
Finance will be the issuer on behalf of the Government of Georgia, the NBG will be 
the official agent of the Ministry of Finance in accordance with the Law on the NBG. 
Not all the operational details of the issuing and management of STGBs have 
been settled yet. It is intended that the first issues will be very short term — 28 day 
bonds — which will be used solely to test the issuance mechanism and educate 
participants in the primary market. It is anticipated that the primary dealers will be 
certified commercial banks. It is unlikely that any foreign companies or banks will be 
allowed to operate as primary dealers. But it is very important that foreigners be 
allowed to participate in the STGB market if for no other reason than that it should 
work to lower the yields on these bonds. Reference to the experience in Russia is 
instructive in this regard. Normally domestic buyers of national debt tend to put a 
lower risk premium on national debt than foreigners — if only because they normally 
do not perceive a foreign exchange risk. In Georgia, because of the widespread use of 
dollars as a savings mechanism and because of past experience of Government default 
on domestic bonds, Georgians are likely to put a higher risk premium on Government 
debt than foreigners who are only likely to be taking a forward looking assessment of 
credit risk and will take greater comfort from the ESAF program. As a symbolic 
confidence building gesture, the Ministry of Finance is to pay GEL 200,000 to 1992 
bond holders. 
STGBs are more likely to provide a basis for the NBG to develop alternative 
monetary policy instruments. Once a liquid STGB market is in place the NBG should 
be able to trade in STGBs buying and selling in the secondary market to move interest 
rates, provided that STGBs develop as a reference rate for interest rates in the 
economy. The credit auctions have failed to achieve that objective but STGBs can be 
used as an alternative to banks deposits and so banks are likely to have to keep their 
deposit rates linked to STGB rates. 
5. Privatization 
While performance in macroeconomic stabilization has been highly impressive, 
structural reform has been moving more slowly. There have been some significant 
achievements. Budgetary subsidies to large state enterprises have been mostly stopped, 
small enterprise' privatization is largely complete, and much of the legal framework 
for private business has been established. Plans have been issued for the privatization 
of much of the electricity generation sector. Yet there has been very little real progress E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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since the middle of 1996. 88 per cent of shares issued in medium and large enterprises 
(MLES) remain under state control, and not a single new medium or large enterprise 
was privatized in the first quarter. Cash auctions of remaining government shares 
continue to attract almost no interest as reserve prices are set too high. The law on 
bankruptcy has yet to be tested. Growth is coming almost entirely from the new small 
private sector while ministries struggle for control of a largely inactive state sector. 
The nature of inherited Soviet industry does not make privatizing what is left 
easy, but there is also a question over the political will to do so in parts of government. 
After considerable pressure from donors a new initiative is now promised to push 
forward with what is described as the second stage of reform. This is long overdue. If 
current economic growth is to be sustained new measures will have to be introduced 
for disposing of the huge state shareholdings at prices that investors will pay, and to 
extend privatization to urban and commercial land. To allow the private sector to 
develop, more attention will have to be paid to developing capital and land markets, 
improving physical and legal infrastructure, and regulation. 
5.1. Small Enterprise Privatization 
Small enterprise privatization has been highly successful in that the 
overwhelming majority of small enterprises have been transferred out of state hands. 
As of April 20 1997, 9,667 small enterprises had been privatized, 93 of them in the 
first quarter of this year. The process is nearly complete everywhere except Achara, 
but even the autonomous republic has made some progress in the first quarter, both in 
corporatizing enterprises and in privatizing them. Most small enterprises are in trade or 
services, and were disposed of by auction, tender or direct sale in approximately equal 
proportions. The sale process was by no means always transparent and it seems that in 
many cases the government could have received much higher prices by more open 
sales. Yet more important is that the enterprises are now in private hands and there is a 
flourishing resale market which is starting to ensure that assets end up in the hands of 
those who can do most with them. Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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Table 13 
Small Privatization by Sector, as of April 20, 1997 
Sector  Approved  Privatised  % of total privatised 
Trade   3,741  3,845  39.8
Communal Services  3,695  3,868  40.0
Manufacturing 319  214  2.2
Agriculture & food industry  548  289  3.0
Construction 165  222  2.3
Transport 73  79  0.8
Social services  85  372  3.8
Sakenergo 31  26  0.3
Oil products corporation  163  163  1.7
Health 747  505  5.2
Bread products corporation  139  84  0.9
Total 9,706  9,667  100.0
Source: Ministry of State Property management 
Note: Numbers of enterprises actually privatized can exceed those approved for privatization 
since some are split up during corporatisation. 
5.2. Medium and Large Enterprise Privatization 
Medium and large enterprise privatization is still largely stalled. The only 
consolation is that the period of inactivity has allowed the Ministry of State Property 
Management (MSPM) to significantly improve the quality of information available on 
progress so far. 
Medium and large enterprises first have to be approved for privatization and then 
valued and established as joint stock companies. The results of this process so far are 
shown in Table 14. 1,049 medium or large joint-stock companies had been established 
on the base of state enterprises by April 1997, and a further 211 had been approved for 
privatization but not corporatized. Only five more enterprises have been approved and 
two corporatized since the end of 1996. The valuation of many enterprises that remain, 
particularly electricity generation companies, has generated intense political debate, 
thereby slowing down the process. E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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Table 14 
Corporatization of MLEs by Sector, as of April 20,1997 
Sector Approved  Established 
Manufacturing 197  170 
Agriculture and food  404  314 
Architecture and construction  219  208 
Trade 81  62 
Transport 116  96 
Social services  49  45 
Mining and chchemicals  31  26 
Oil products  46  27 
Bread Corporation  61  40 
Gas 54  26 
Poti and Batumi Airports  2  1 
Energy sector  -  34 
Total 1,260  1,049 
Source: Ministry of State Property Management. 
524 medium and large enterprises had actually been privatized as of the end of 
April, in the sense that more than 50 per cent of their shares were transferred to private 
ownership. This is exactly the same is at the end of 1996, and only eight more than in 
August 1996. For the first time sectoral breakdowns of what has been privatized are 
available, calculated by GET on the basis of MSPM data. Most progress has been 
made in trade and social services, and least in the energy and mining sectors. 
Not only has there been almost no progress since August 1996, but when the 
proportions of shares in government ownership is looked at, it becomes clear that only 
the smaller enterprises have been privatized and that remaining state shareholdings 
even in nominally private enterprises are very high. 88 per cent of shares remain in 
state hands. The only sectors where more than half of shares are privately held are 
trade, services, social services and agriculture. In transport and energy, over 98 per 
cent of shares are still state owned. These figures do not even include the large 
electricity generators, which have been held back for good reasons, while a regulatory 
framework is being established, but will still greatly increase the proportion of assets 
still in state hands. Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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Table 15 
Privatization of MlEs by Sector, as of April 20, 1997 
Sector   # of established 
MLEs 
# of privatized 
MLEs 
% of privatised 
Agriculture and food  275  155  56.4 
Construction 140  61  43.6 
Energy 93  7  7.5 
Manufacturing 265  133  50.2 
Mining 20  2  10.0 
Service 32  20  62.5 
Social services  53  42  79.2 
Trade 45  35  77.8 
Transport 115  69  60.0 
Total 1,038  524  50.5 
Source: GET calculations from Ministry of State Property Management data. 
 
7 per cent of shares issued have been disposed of through voucher auctions, 3 per 
cent sold directly, and 1 per cent given free or at a discount to workers and managers. 
Voucher privatization finished in July 1996. It was successful in that 90 per cent of 
vouchers issued were used. Yet only just over half of the shares offered at voucher 
auctions were bought, despite the fact that those offered were usually the more 
attractive enterprises. Direct sales of enterprises, often through lease/purchase options 
and usually to existing management were the next most important means of disposal, 
particularly in the smaller trade and service businesses. At the beginning of 
privatization managers and employees of most companies were given the option to 
buy 51 per cent of the shares of their enterprises. 30 per cent of the payment was to be 
made in privatization vouchers by November 15 1995, and the remainder to be paid in 
cash at a discounted price by July l 1996. This was also not a great success. 600 
enterprises applied for the option but only 140 made the first payment in full despite 
postponements to the deadline. 400 enterprises made partial payments but 
subsequently lost the right to buy the rest of the shares at a discount. Often employees 
failed to collect enough money together, but it was also the case that discounts 
available at voucher auctions very often turned out to be greater than those offered to 
insiders, and many bought their shares at voucher auctions instead. 
It is known that 20 per cent of shares bought at voucher auctions were bought by 
foreign investors, though only by six companies, and three quarters of them by New 
Century Holdings. There have also been cases of sales of shares to foreigners via 
workers and managers, though the program of ,case by case privatization' direct to 
foreign investors has so far failed. Total foreign ownership of Georgian medium and 
large enterprises is probably considerably less than 4 per cent. Georgian investment 
funds were a notable failure, due to public mistrust after experience of pyramid 
schemes, and acquired only 4 per cent of the 7 per cent of shares bought through 
voucher auctions (i.e., 0.3 per cent of all shares). It seems that the main result of 
privatization so far has been to transfer a rather small part of Georgian industry to its 
workers and managers. Although most activity does now seem to be in the private 
sector a World Bank survey from the summer of 1996 found that half the population E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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receive their main income from private sector activity this is due more to the 
development of new enterprises than to privatization. 
The main lesson to be drawn from this is that discounts demanded by buyers are 
currently huge. The effectiveness of voucher privatization was limited by the 
minimum prices set at special voucher auctions. It was not allowed to buy more than 
45 shares for one voucher, and thus nearly half of the shares offered attracted no bids. 
The average discount on shares that did sell was still very large. Vouchers traded at 
about USD 5 compared to a nominal value of USD 30, and the average voucher 
bought 29 shares, resulting in a discount to the nominal price of shares of 
approximately 88 per cent. Moreover this was for the more attractive sections of 
Georgian industry, offered in an attempt to make voucher privatization successful. 
Discounts were high for a number of reasons: because much of the population was too 
poor to consider doing anything with their vouchers except selling them immediately; 
because there was justified skepticism on the general worth of surviving Georgian 
industry; but above all because information available on companies was inadequate 
and control rights insecure. The true value of enterprises clearly varies widely and has 
little relation to nominal valuation, which was based on book value in 1993, before 
extensive pillaging and debt accumulation. Existing managers have incentives to 
overestimate the value of poor enterprises, to persuade investors to come in, or to 
underestimate the value of good ones, to allow themselves to buy shares cheaply. The 
rights of outside investors to impose their will against that of existing insiders and has 
yet to be firmly established. 
The government seems to have no response to these problems, and thus 
privatization has effectively stopped. Cash auctions continue, offering shares at a 
reserve price of 150 per cent of nominal value. Since the first cash auction they have 
sold 0.8 per cent of shares offered. The twelfth cash auction attracted no bids at all. 
There are some plans to reduce prices but they still face political opposition. A new 
law on privatization, soon to be passed by Parliament, seems to contain little new. It 
will require the approval of a special commission under the President for enterprises to 
be sold for less than book value. If real progress is to be made the discounting process 
needs to be made much more automatic and less discretionary. It will have to be 
accepted that the value of most enterprises to investors is considerably below the 
nominal value of their shares. 
Revenue from privatization could arguably be increased by delaying 
privatization of many enterprises for some years, until incomes in Georgia are higher 
and credit more easily available. Yet the costs of this in terms of continuing 
mismanagement and inactivity of enterprises would be very high. 78 per cent of 
remaining state shareholdings have already been transferred for management, either 
back to the sectoral ministries and departments that controlled them in communist 
times, or to other state companies. This is not an encouraging sign of commitment to 
private ownership, and will not reassure private investors in these companies that they 
can exert control rights. Capital clearly is coming into Georgia, whether from 
foreigners or repatriated flight capital, but the majority seems to be invested in small 
new enterprises or in real estate. If this money is to be attracted to privatization the 
transparency of company accounting needs to be improved, possibly with a revised 
law on accountancy. Control rights need to be much more securely established, Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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including the establishment of share registries and transferability with the development 
of a stock market. Few minority shareholders now feel they have real stakes in their 
enterprises, but if foreign investment is to increase, portfolio investment by foreigners, 
not just direct investment, has to be encouraged. MSPM has decided to increase the 
charter capital of seven already privatized enterprises because of what it considers 
fraud during the original privatization. Some of these cases are now the subject of 
court action as existing investors find their shares diluted. The new privatization law 
should limit such retrospective revisions to three years from the date of privatization, 
but this is not likely to fully reassure investors. 
The other main problem for privatization is the nature of inherited Soviet 
industry. The total value of shares issued in medium and large enterprises is USD 
1.490 billion. The largest ten enterprises, account for an extraordinary 71 per cent of 
this valuations and the largest four account for 57 per cent. If the top ten enterprises 
are excluded, then 37 per cent of the rest has been privatized. Apart from Chiatura 
Manganese, part of which was sold at voucher auctions, insignificant shares of all the 
largest enterprises have been sold. Their apparent dominance of the economy does 
raise questions about regulation, and encourages politicians to think of them as 
strategic assets that should not fall into the hands of foreigners. More accurately their 
relative size is a result firstly of the overspecialization inflicted on Georgia during the 
Soviet era, and secondly of the collapse of much of the rest of industry. Some of these 
enterprises will be hard to dispose of as the investments required for restructuring are 
huge. In some cases investors perhaps could be attracted but groups in the government 
are reluctant to lose control. In January instead of the expected tender for management 
of a majority share of the Madneuli copper mine complex, the tender was reduced to 
one for management of a smaller company controlled by Madneuli, and this has still 
not happened. More encouraging is a bolder decision made in April to try to sell off 
the shares of the Maudi textile plant with a reserve of only half their nominal price. 
The revenues are to be given to Maudi as a credit, at 12 per cent interest, and in 
addition the enterprise's debts to the budget and special state funds are frozen until 
2000. This may also be the result of effective lobbying, but restructuring does seem 
more likely to happen in the private sector, and with the temporary removal of the debt 
burden. 
To meet the World Bank requirements, Ministry of State Property Management 
decided to sell 273 state enterprises in one no-minimum price auction through July 21- 
July 31. The form of the auction is closed and the minimum bid is one Lari (USD .75). 
So everyone who decides to participate in the auction will became an owner of shares 
in enterprise he/she likes, proportionally to installments.  
5.3. Restructuring 
Attempts at restructuring the large state owned enterprises are beginning. A state 
commission was established at the end of January to come up with plans to restructure 
Chiatura Manganese. At the beginning of February a presidential decree charged the 
management of the Rustavi Metallurgic plant together with MSPM and the 
administration of Kvemo Kartli to prepare proposals on the restructuring of the plant. E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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From the beginning of April two units and the thermal power supply of the plant 
became separate companies, though owned by the metallurgic plant. All workers were 
laid off to be rehired under different contracts, and up to 2,800 currently on leave will 
apparently not be reemployed. Yet while enterprises remain under state control this 
will inevitably be a slow and political process, and subject to energetic lobbying. 
There is very little evidence on restructuring so far in the private sector, but there 
are clearly significant obstacles. Firstly not enough has been privatized. The large 
remaining state shareholdings in private companies may impede owners hoping to 
raise new private capital, or to make difficult decisions on reducing employment. 
Secondly the ownership structure that has resulted from privatization so far, seems to 
be quite dispersed and to consist mainly of existing workers and managers; not a 
recipe for radical decision making. A World Bank study in the summer of 1996 of 21 
enterprises did conclude that privatized companies had started to improve their 
financial I performance by laying off workers, improving their marketing and 
changing their product lines. The majority state owned enterprises had attempted less 
restructuring and were in a worse financial condition. Still the evidence is far from 
'conclusive and the situation is worrying. The Czech Republic, though at a much later 
stage of reform, has recently demonstrated how a lack of attention to macroeconomic 
restructuring can undermine very impressive macroeconomic achievements. 
The Post Privatization Development Center, established with World Bank and 
TACIS assistance, has been renamed the Center for Enterprise Restructuring and 
Management Assistance, and is finally ready to start working. The main limitation on 
its activity seems likely to be the still small number of privatized large enterprises that 
both have a viable future and a management ready to contemplate radical change 
rather than the resurrection of old trading arrangements. Other actions planned by 
donors to assist restructuring includes assistance with the adoption of securities trading 
rules. A law establishing standards on disclosure, trading and listing should be passed 
later in 1997. This is likely to be a condition of the next tranche of World Bank 
structural adjustment lending. Open share trading might start to put long overdue 
pressure on managers. 
The most effective immediate spur to management action would be to put 
bankruptcy legislation to work. There have still been no forced bankruptcies, although 
the new bankruptcy law has been in effect since the beginning of the year. 
Bankruptcies and the voluntary shedding of unnecessary assets and activities would 
also have a strong positive effect on other businesses by puffing new assets on to the 
market where they could be bought and operated by more dynamic entrepreneurs. 
Private sector firms are understandably reluctant to test the bankruptcy mechanism, as 
the current state of the legal system could make the process costly and unpredictable. 
There apparently remain contradictions between the bankruptcy law and other 
company laws. Uncertainty is also such that members of the government have 
expressed concern that bankruptcy could be used by insiders as a way of obtaining 
valuable assets cheaply. Still, as most firms remain state owned, and most debts are 
still to state organizations, it is probably up to the government to force the first case. 
The State Tax lnspectorate has announced plans to bring bankruptcy action against a 
number of debtors, but the list publicized contains so many of the most promising 
enterprises in Georgia (including Kaspi cement, Bagrationi champagne and Tbilisi Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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wine factories), that it would not be surprising if these cases were settled before 
coming to court. 
5.4. Electricity Sector Privatization 
Electricity sector privatization is also subject to delays. The sector has been 
divided into three parts: generation, transmission and distribution. Generation and 
distribution are to be privatized, and transmission to remain under state control as 
Sakenergo. Valuation of the generation and distribution companies was supposed to be 
finished by April lst but has been postponed until at least June lst. Valuation of the 
larger generators may take even longer, and the exact mechanism for their sale has not 
yet been defined. 
Distribution companies will be the first to be privatized. As a first stage 30 per 
cent of the shares of the distribution companies of Abasha, Lagodekhi, Tsalenjikha 
and Chiatura will be offered at a special auction. The effective privatization of 
distribution companies actually started in the middle of 1996, as state distribution 
companies established smaller private firms, 14 in Tbilisi and 10 in Kutaisi. The 
experiment was not a success in terms of improving collection rates and these have 
now been abolished. It remains to be seen whether a more comprehensive privatization 
process will find more competent collectors: the viability of the rest of the sector 
depends on this. 
The main problem, as explained in Chapter Two, is collection from households, 
which remains at about 30 per cent of the amount billed. The rise in household tariff 
rates from 3.3 to 4.5 tetri per kilowatt hour was postponed until the beginning of July. 
Pricing still raises very serious problems. It is possible that higher prices may 
encourage greater non-payment. To avoid this the legal and technical means to cut off 
non-payers need to be established, and basic tariff structures need to be perceived as 
fair. There will be considerable resentment if well connected state enterprises continue 
to get special treatment for example. Although raising electricity prices is not normally 
regressive, in that the rich do use and pay disproportionately more, there is also a case 
for a 'lifeline tariff' with low charges for consumption up to a certain level and much 
higher prices for using more. If the distributors were allowed discretion to operate 
such systems themselves, tariffs might become less of a political issue. Initial attempts 
at electricity distribution privatization in Hungary for example raised very little money 
because investors lacked confidence in future tariff regulation. Prices paid for 
generation companies also will depend on investors assessment of the competence and 
independence of regulation, as politically motivated tariff and rule changes can ruin 
long term investment decisions. A law on electrical energy which will define the 
functions of the Electricity Regulation Commission is still awaiting discussion by 
Parliament. 
5.5. Land Privatization  
Privatization of land is also proceeding extremely slowly. 12.4 per cent of land in 
Georgia is now privately owned. Only Georgian citizens may own agricultural land, E. Djugeli, D. Chantladze 
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and there has been no privatization of urban and commercial land. A further 22,000 
hectares of agricultural land were privatized in the first quarter, bringing the total from 
24.3 to 25.0 per cent of all agricultural land. The least privatized category is pasture. 
However, 919,000 hectares of this are in mountainous areas, for which there is little 
demand, and 600,000 hectares are affected by erosion and can not be used. Most of 
that which is close to villages and needed for livestock is privatized or leased. 
Excluding pasture, a more impressive 54 per cent of the good quality agricultural land 
has been privatized. The most notable area lagging behind is Achara, which has only 
just started to prepare its land reform. 
 
Table 16 
Distribution of Agricultural Land (Hectares) 
Land Category  As of January 
1,1997  %  As of April 1, 
1997  % 
Total agricultural land  2,988,600   2,988,600   
  Privatized  726,700 24.3  748,500  25.0 
  Leased  470,300 15.7  553,500   18.5 
  Not distributed  1,791,600 59.9  1,686,600  56.4 
Arable 781,100   781,100   
  Privatised  406,900 52.1  412,300  52.8 
  Leased  198,300 25.4  235,000  30.1 
  Not distributed  175,900 22.5  133,800  17.1 
Perennials 284,600   284,600   
  Privatised  187,900 66.0  190,600  67.0 
  Leased  31,000 10.9  37,500  13.2 
  Not distributed  65,700 23.1  56,500  19.9 
Hayfields 148,000   148,000   
  Privatised  48,000 32.4  55,100  37.2 
  Leased  20,500 13.9  31,000  20.9 
  Not distributed  79,500 53.7  61,900  41.8 
Pastures 1,774,900   1,774,900   
  Privatised  83,900 4.7  90,500  5.1 
  Leased  220,200 12.4  250,000  14.1 
  Not distributed  1,470,800 82.9  1,434,400  80.8 
Source: State Department for Land Management 
Note: The table excludes Abkhazia and South Osetia, but includes Achara, although there has 
been no land privatization in Achara. 
In addition to that privatized, 18.5 per cent (553,5 thousand hectares) of 
agricultural land has now been leased out by local authorities. 140,000 hectares is 
leased to 40,000 individuals and 413,000 hectares to 1,330 companies. How many of 
the companies are privately owned is not recorded. With effect from July all long term 
leases should be transferable and given on the basis of competitive price bidding, 
rather than the very discretionary system still in place now. 
Land that is not distributed is generally lying idle, or just subject to local grazing 
arrangements. In addition much of the land that is nominally privatized is not claimed 
or not used, often because of problems obtaining inputs and irrigation, and sometimes Georgia on Its Way to the Market Oriented Economy  
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because of hostility to outsiders using land. Agricultural production figures are 
improving, but the scope for increasing production by better use of land seems to be 
huge. There is still no effective land market, which acts as a severe restriction on 
efficient usage, and on economic growth in general. The problem is the expense of 
creating an accurate land register. World Bank estimates put the likely cost at about 
USD 42 million. The World Bank plans pilot registration schemes in Mtskheta and 
Gardabani, to be funded by a concessionary loan of approximately USD 6 million. 
Revenues from this registration could then be used to fund other areas, but the process 
would take a very long time. French and German companies have proposed faster 
schemes to register all land, but sources of financing remain uncertain. 